Why Amend IT Act

The IT act came into existence to protect the users from the crime related to electronic space, we know that India is a IT hub and a largest democratic country, That’s why we need IT laws .But Laws don’t keep pace with technology.

And at one point of time the technology surpasses and comes above the law, when this happens then the need to amend the law arises. This is what happened with the 66A IT act.

Let us first look at it what is 66A:

*[66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc..- 

Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,-

(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or

(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will, persistently makes by making use of such computer resource or a communication device,

(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.

Explanation: For the purposes of this section, terms "Electronic mail" and "Electronic Mail Message" means a message or information created or transmitted or received on a computer, computer system, computer resource or communication device including attachments in text, image, audio, video and any other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the message.

The analysis of the current IT act gives an Idea that the 66A IT act is vague it talks about the information but how it gets transmitted to other person this is not mentioned as in the year 2000 there was only one way to transmit information i.e. through E-mails or may through few websites but the concept of blogging or “free speech” was not there at that time. Because information through speech is different than other form of information. For example-: we have Article 14 for freedom of speech but for intimidating someone with information passed through messages does not come under freedom of speech.

The 66A IT act certainly needs to be amended as IT act was passed in year 2000 at that time there was no concept of social media, the 66A act was intended to cover only email messages ,the messages of email cannot be compared with that of post on social media. The email messages are personal in nature and is generally intended to single person, But in social media you have an audience and the case of posting on the wall certainly comes under freedom of speech,  so the posting on the facebook wall must be equated with article 14, and same limitation must be applied to it rather than treating it as a message. So with current technological advancement there certainly need to amend the IT laws.

By: Nitish Banka

Dowry Death and Indian Families.

Dowry Death and Indian Families.

In today Indian society dowry is like a norm, we see that people spend lavishly on marriages. The root cause of the problem starts from here, The parents of the bride fulfil all the wishes of groom’s family like spending lavishly on wedding, gifting cars etc. when the bride reaches her matrimonial home, The selfishness of groom’s family grows .Now they demand more things like household items, property etc. Not in the condition to fulfil the infinite demands of groom family, The Groom family starts to harass the newly wedded wife so much and so grave that she thinks it’s better to end the life than to live it. In the end the lavishly solemnized wedding ends into tragic death of the bride. The cause of death is not natural that is for sure, it may be due to poison, suicide, even hanging on the ceiling, burns.

This the most common story of all the dowry related deaths .For this common story there must be a common Law on different footing as that of murder and culpable homicide as the cases of murder and culpable homicide demands much greater evidence and are much complicated. The dowry death is covered in sec 304 B IPC which is -:

(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called" dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub- section," dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961 ).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.

Basic Ingredients-:

1.       There must be a death of the woman.

2.       The death of the woman must be in un natural circumstances.

3.       And there must be evidence that she was subjected to cruelty due to demand of dowry.

So there is a stark difference between section 299/300 and 304B as 299/300 has much wider scope and covers many motives, But sec 304B the main motive is Dowry due to which cruelty and harassment is performed on the bride and due to which she died.

Evidence in 304 B-:

For the protection of harassed party the evidence act comes to rescue for a crime to come under the 4 corners of evidence act, The material evidence is cruelty and harassment on the bride.

113B. Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a women and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry; the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

Now due to this section the burden of proof shifts to defendants, now they have to show that they have not done cruelty and harassment in order to evade this section.

Unlike in murder cases there is always presumption of innocence, The section of murder has to pass through quite stringent tests than that of dowry death. In dowry related death those people who are involved in cruelty(relatives) are held to be liable for the dowry death. 

U.S. to Expand Its Definition of Rape in Statistics

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WASHINGTON — The federal government is changing its longstanding definition of “forcible rape” in compiling national crime statistics — expanding both the definition of victims, to include males, and the types of sexual assault that will be counted in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report.

The new definition, which has been in the works for several months and was formally announced by the Obama administration on Friday, will replace a narrower definition of “forcible rape” with one that includes, among other things, forcible oral or anal penetration. The narrower definition, which is limited to vaginal penetration, has been used since the 1920s in tracking how often such crimes are reported around the country.

Victim advocacy groups have long criticized the old definition as outdated, saying it left out many crimes that were prosecuted as rape under state laws but that were not reflected in national statistics. Last year, an F.B.I. advisory committee of law enforcement agencies agreed to a Justice Department request to update the definition.

“It’s about more than a definition,” Lynn Rosenthal, the White House adviser on violence against women, said in a conference call with reporters to discuss the change. “It’s a change of our understanding of rape and how seriously we take it as a country.”

The old definition — “the carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly and against her will” — covered only forcible penetration of a woman’s vagina by a penis, and excluded many other kinds of sexual assaults that count as rape under more modern definitions.

For example, the outdated definition did not count forcible anal or oral penetration, the penetration of the vagina or anus with an object or other body part, the rape of a man, or the rape of a woman by another woman.

It also did not cover nonconsensual sex that does not involve physical force — like the rape of people who are unable to grant consent because they are drugged, very drunk or younger than the age of statutory consent in their state, a number that varies across the country.

The new definition, which was drafted with input from local and state law enforcement agencies based on more modernized rape laws, encompasses a broader range of such circumstances. Specifically, it covers the “penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim.”

Many states have long since adopted a more expansive definition of rapes in their criminal laws, and officials said that local police departments had been breaking down their numbers and sending only a fraction of the reported rapes to the F.B.I. to comply with outdated federal standards.

For example, the New York Police Department reported 1,369 rapes in 2010, but only 1,036 were entered in the federal figures. However, the police department in Chicago, which had nearly 1,400 reported sexual assaults in 2010, refused to discard cases that did not fit the narrower federal definition when reporting its crime statistics; as a result, the F.B.I.’s uniform crime report — which reported 84,767 forcible rapes that year — did not include any rapes from that city.

The question of what kinds of sexual assault are properly categorized as “rape” recently received greater scrutiny after the high-profile arrest in November of Jerry Sandusky, a former assistant football coach at Pennsylvania State University who was charged with sexually abusing several boys across a 15-year period.

Reported acts like some that Mr. Sandusky has been accused of — including allegedlysubjecting a 10-year-old boy to anal penetration — would not be counted in national rape statistics under the old definition, but will be counted in them under the new one. The change to the “rape” definition was already in process before the Sandusky case came to light, however.

Victim advocacy groups have called for years for the old definition to be revised, and in more recent years several prominent leaders of law enforcement agencies had joined that chorus. The movement gained force last summer when elements of the Obama administration — including the office of Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., who as a senator had been a chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act — proposed making a formal request to broaden the definition. The change was approved by Robert S. Mueller III, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and announced by Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr.

The revision to the definition of rape is only for the purposes of deciding what kinds of incidents will be included in the “rape” category of the F.B.I.’s compilation of national crime statistics. It does not change the underlying criminal codes governing the prosecution of sexual assaults.

The F.B.I. said it expected that it would take several years for all of the 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies around the country that voluntarily contribute data to its Uniform Crime Report to adjust their reporting to include the wider definition of rape, and that as they do so, the number of reported rapes is likely to rise significantly for several years running.

In the meantime, the bureau said it would ask local police departments to continue to break out their statistics for the number of rapes under the old definition so that it can still make a meaningful comparison in the trend of such crime rates when compared with previous years.

A version of this article appeared in print

Condonation of Delay in case Appeals

Condonation of Delay in case Appeals

Section 5 of the Limitation deals with condonation of delay in case of appeal. Since the limitation period for appeals is very short, this section is then introduced to meet the end of justice such that the purpose of justice is not defeated merely because there is “sufficient cause” is present due to which an appeal was not preferred. This section extends the limitation period.

The word “”sufficient cause” is an important phrase in this section. Since the section is not a matter of right for the party who pleads the condonation, but it depends on the discretion of the court.The court must be satisfied that the delay is caused due to a genuine reason. It is sufficiency of the cause which counts, and not length of delay - Expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction - As regards delay on the part of State, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible - Expression "sufficient cause" should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay - Matter remitted to High Court to decide the criminal revision on merits - Suggestions made to prevent delay in State litigation - Administration of justice – [

STATE (NCT OF DELHI) VS AHMED JAAN. AUGUST 12, 2008]

Now the question arises what can be the “sufficient cause” which the court accepts-:

1.       Illness it is the sufficient cause when it is proved without the reasonable cause that the appellant was not able to file an appeal.

2.        Imprisonment-The imprisonment of the appellant can be a sufficient cause.

3.       Ignorance of law can also be a one of the reason but it should be bonafide.

4.       Mistake of fact-It should be real and unintentional.

5.       Delay in obtaining copies of judgement can be sufficient cause also this reason is also covered in section 12.

6.       Poverty, Infancy, Pardah

7.       Mistake of Counsel-mistake by counsel which is not negligence.

But to enjoy the benefit of section 5 There should be no negligence due to inaction of the party is a prerequisite, also length of delay is not a matter of concern but reasonable explanation why the delay has occurred is the subject matter of this section.

In the end the court prefer liberal approach in favour of justice and favour only reasonable excuses to condone any delay in filing an appeal .However the court must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the delay was genuine and it must be condoned in favour of justice. Also there should be absence of negligence in order to make the cause reasonable. 

Abatement of case

Abatement of case

Abatement-:Abatement means “to put an end”

Criminal Suits

Death of the accused Person

 When the accused dies during the trial it automatically abets the suit However the police completes its investigation as per 173 CrPC and send their report to court.

Death of accused during trial - Proceedings will abate - Legal heirs cannot be prosecuted. (Sham LalVs Raj Kumar Aggarwal) 2002(2) CIVIL COURT CASES 370 (P&H) : 2002(2) CRIMINAL COURT CASES 505 (P&H) : 2002 (2) ISJ (BANKING) 0083

Death of Complainant

The Provisions of CRPC 256 shall apply if there is Death of the complainant which is -:

(1) If the summons has been issued on complaint and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day:

Provided that where the complainant is represented by a pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case.

(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall, so far as may be, apply also to cases where the non-appearance of the complainant is due to his death.

In the cases of Appeal if accused dies but an appeal against his conviction is Pending

Section 394 Crpc

(1) Every appeal under section 377 or section 378 shall finally abate on the death of the accused.

(2) Every other appeal under this Chapter (except an appeal from a sentence of fine) shall finally abate on the death of the appellant:

Provided that where the appeal is against a conviction and sentence of death or of imprisonment, and the appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal, any if his near relatives may, within thirty days of the death of the appellant, apply to the Appellate Court for leave to continue the appeal; and if leave is granted, the appeal shall not abate.

Explanation. In this section, "near relative" means a parent, spouse, lineal descendant, brother or sister.

ABATEMENT IN CASE OF CIVIL SUITS

In civil suits the abetment rule is simple if any Right to Sue is there then there is no abatement then legal representative on application to the court is made(within limitation period) party to the suit. else the suit abates in favour of opposite deceased party.

ORDER XXII. DEATH, MARRIAGE AND INSOLVENCY OR PARTIES

1. No abatement by party's death if right to sue survives

The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives.

2. Procedure where one of several plaintiffs or defendants dies and right to sue survives

Where there are more plaintiffs or defendants than one, and any of them dies, and where the right to sue survives to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, the Court shall cause an entry to the effect to be made on the record, and the suit shall proceed at the instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving defendant or defendants.

Cases in which plaintiff dies but right to sue survives but whom to sue?

3. Procedure in case of death of one of several plaintiffs or of sole plaintiff

(1) Where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the right to the sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.

(2) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned, and, on the application of the defendant, the Court may award to him the costs which he may have incurred in defending the suit, to be recovered from the estate of the deceased plaintiff.

4. Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant

(1) Where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.

(2) Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant.

(3) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant.

¹[(4) The Court whenever it thinks fit, may exempt the plaintiff from the necessity of substituting the legal representatives of any such defendant who has failed to file a written statement or who, having filed it, has failed to appear and contest the suit at the hearing; and judgment may, in such case, be pronounced against the said defendant not withstanding the death of such defendant and shall have the same force and effect as if it has been pronounced before death took place.

(5) Where-

(a) the plaintiff was ignorant of the death of a defendant, and could not, for that reason, make an application for the substitution of the legal representative of the defendant under this rule within the period specified in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) and the suit has, in consequence, abated, and

(b) the plaintiff applies after the expiry of the period specified therefor in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), for setting aside the abatement and also for the admission of that application under section 5 of that Act on the ground that he had, by reason of such ignorance, sufficient cause for not making the application within the period specified in the said Act,

the Court shall, in considering the application under the said section 5, have due regard to the fact of such ignorance, if proved.]

1. Ins. by Act No. 104 of 1976, sec. 73 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).

¹[4A. Procedure where there is no legal representative

(1) If, in any suit, it shall appear to the Court that any party who has died during the pendency of the suit has no legal representative, the Court may, on the application of any party to the suit, proceed in the absence of a person representing the estate of the deceased person, or may by order appoint the Administrator-General, or an officer of the Court or such other person as it thinks fit to represent the estate of the deceased person for the purpose of the suit; and any judgment or order subsequently given or made in the suit shall bind the estate of the deceased person to the same extent as he would have been bound if a personal representative of the deceased person had been a party to the suit.

(2) Before making an order under this rule, the Court-

(a) may require notice of the application for the order to be given to such (if any) of the persons having an interest in the estate of the deceased person as it thinks fit; and

(b) shall ascertain that the person proposed to be appointed to represent the estate of the deceased person is willing to be so appointed and has no interest adverse to that of the deceased person.]

1. Ins. by Act No. 104 of 1976, sec. 72 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).

5. Determination of question as to legal representative.

Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or a deceased defendant, such question shall be determined by the Court:

¹[Provided that where such question arises before an Appellate Court, that Court may, before determining the question, direct any subordinate Court to try the question and to return the records together with evidence, if any, recorded at such trial, its findings and reasons therefor, and the Appellate Court may take the same into consideration in determining the question.]

1. Ins. by Act No. 104 of 1976 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).

6. No abatement by reason of death after hearing

Nothwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing rules, whether the cause of action survives or not, there shall be no abatement by reason of the death of either party between the conclusion of the hearing and the pronouncing of the judgment, but judgment may in such case be pronounced notwithstanding the death and shall have the same force and effect as if it had been pronounced before the death took place.

7. Suit not abated by marriage of female party

(1) The marriage of a female plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate, but the suit may notwithstanding be proceeded with to judgment, and, where the decree is against a female defendant, it may be executed against her alone.

(2) Where the husband is by law liable for the debts of his wife, the decree may, with the permission of the Court, be executed against the husband also; and in case of judgment for the wife, execution of the decree may, with such permission, be issued upon the application of the husband, where the husband is by law entitled to the subject matter of the decree.

8. When plaintiffs insolvency bars suit

(1) The insolvency of a plaintiff in any suit which the assignee or receiver might maintain for the benefit of his creditors, shall not cause the suit to abate, unless such assignee or receiver declines to continue the suit or (unless for any special reason the Court otherwise directs) to give security for the costs thereof within such time as the Court may direct.

(2) Procedure where assignee fails to continue suit, or give security-Where the assignee or receiver neglects or refuses to continue the suit and to give such security within the time so ordered, the defendant may apply for the dismissal of the suit on the ground of the plaintiff s insolvency, and the Court may make an order dismissing the suit and awarding to the defendant the costs which he has insured in defending the same to be proved as a debt against the plaintiffs estate.

9. Effect of abatement or dismissal

(1) Where a suit abates or is dismissed under this Order, no fresh suit shall be brought on the same cause of action.

(2) The plaintiff or the person claiming to be the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or the assignee or the receiver in the case of an insolvent plaintiff may apply for an order to set aside the abatement or dismissal; and if it is proved that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit, the Court shall set aside the abatement or dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit.

(3) The provisions of section 5 of the ¹[Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877)] shall apply to applications under sub-rule (2).

²[Explanation-Nothing in this rule shall be construed as barring, in any later suit, a defence based on the facts which constituted the cause of action in the suit which had abated or had been dismissed under this Order]

1. See now the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), Ss. 4 and 5.

2. Ins. by Act No. 104 of 1976 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).

10. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit

(1) In other cases of an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved.

(2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal therefrom shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the person who procured such attachment to the benefit of sub-rule (1).

¹[10A. Duty of pleader to communicate to Court death of a party.

Wherever a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to know of the death of that party, he shall inform the Court about it, and the Court shall there upon give notice of such death to the other party, and, for this purpose, the contract between the pleader and the deceased party shall be deemed to subsist.]

1. Ins. by Act No. 104 of 1976, sec. 73 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977).

11. Application of Order to appeals.

In the application of this Order to appeals, so far as may be, the word "plaintiff shall be held to include an appellant, the word "defendant" a respondent, and the word "suit" an appeal.

12. Application of Order to proceedings.

Nothing in rules 3, 4 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in executive of a decree or order.

No offence u/s 138 of N.I. Act is committed for dishonour of cheque given as security deposit

 Judgment IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Joseph Vilangadan. v. Phenomenal Health Care Services Ltd. & Anr. CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.2243 OF 2009 CORAM : J.H.Bhatia, J. DATE : 20th July, 2010 1 Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 2 There is no dispute that the respondent no.1/complainant and M/s. Encon Engineering and Contractors (Hereinafter referred to as ‘Contractors’) had entered into an agreement on 28th January, 2005 whereby Contractors had undertaken to carry out certain works for the respondent. As per the said contract, Contractors deposited the sum of Rs. 10 lacs by undated cheque no.027840 drawn against South Indian Bank Ltd., Palarivattom Branch, Cochin branch with the respondent no.1 as refundable security deposit for the due performance of the agreement. The said undated cheque was in custody of the respondent no.1 and it appears that the respondent no.1 filled in the date on undated cheque as “4.6.2008″. The cheque was presented to the drawee bank through the banker of the respondent no.1. Cheque was returned unpaid on the ground that the drawer had stopped the payment. Therefore, notice was issued by the respondent to the contractor as well as it’s managing partner for the payment of the cheque amount . In spite of notice, payment was not made. Therefore, the respondent no.1 filed complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate 44th Court, Andheri. Process was issued against the accused, who is the petitioner before this Court. Petitioner/accused challenged the issuance of process by filing revision application no.789/2009 before the Sessions Court, Gr. Bombay. By the impugned order dated 8th June, 2009, the learned Additional Sessions Judge rejected the revision application. Hence this petition. 3. At the outset it may be stated that before the revisional Court, petitioner had taken several grounds challenging the issuance of process. However, during the arguments before this Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner restricted the challenge only to one point. According to him, cheque was not issued in discharge of any debt or liability and as the cheque was issued as security deposit, provisions of Section 138 are not applicable. The learned counsel placed reliance upon several authorities in support of his contention. The learned counsel for the respondent/complainant contended that the said cheque was deposited in lieu of the amount of Rs. 10 lacs which would be otherwise required to be deposited as security by the contractor with the respondent for due performance of the contact and, therefore, it must be held that the cheque was issued in discharge of “other liability.” 4. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that where any cheque was drawn by a person on account maintained by him with the banker for the payment of any amount of money to another person for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability and it was returned by the drawee bank unpaid either because the amount of money in the account is insufficient or it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid, such person shall be deemed to have been committed offence and shall be liable to punishment with imprisonment or with fine or with both. Of course, before the offence is committed, several other conditions are required to be fulfilled. We are not concerned with the same for the decision of the present matter. mportant ingredient for the offence punishable under Section 138 is that cheque must have been issued for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability. If the cheque is not issued for the discharge of any debt or other liability, Section 138 can not be invoked. It is now well settled legal position that if the cheque is issued only as security for performance of certain contract or an agreement and not towards the discharge of any debt or other liability, offence punishable under section 138 is not made out. In Travel Force v. Mohan N. Bhave and Another 2007 Mh.L.J.3339 , the cheque in question was issued by the accused for investment in fixed deposit and it was accepted by the complainant as fixed deposit in the scheme. As the cheque was dishonoured, the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed. Process was issued by the Magistrate. However, the Sessions Court set aside the order issuing the process holding that the cheque was not issued for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability and, therefore, presumption under Section 139 could not arise in favour of the complainant. Revision application filed by the complainant was rejected by this High Court holding that when the cheque was issued only as a deposit and not in discharge of any debt or liability, offence under Section 138 is not made out. 5. In M.S.Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala and Another (2006) 6 SCC 39, accused and the complainant were brokers working in the stock exchange and the complainant was to enter into certain transactions on behalf of the accused. The cheque was issued for an amount of Rs. 2,95,033/by the accused in favour of the complainant. On presentation, the cheque was dishonoured. After notice also the payment was not made. In the case under Section 138 plea of the accused was that the complainant was in dire need of financial assistance and the said cheque was issued so as to enable him to tide over his financial difficulties and not in discharge of any debt or liability payable to the complainant. During the trial, it was revealed that there was discrepancy of more than Rs. 14 lacs in the account maintained by the complainant. Accused was convicted by the trial Court but was acquitted by the appellate Court . High Court set aside the acquittal and convicted the accused. Accused went to the Supreme Court. After going to the facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court observed thus in paragraph 52: “52. We, in the facts and circumstances of this case, need not go into the question as to whether even if the prosecution fails to prove that a large portion of the amount claimed to be a part of the debt was not owing and due to the complainant by the accused and only because he has issued a cheque for a higher amount, he would be convicted if it is held that existence of debt in respect of large part of the said amount has not been proved. The appellants clearly said that nothing is due and the cheque was issued by way of security. The said defence has been accepted as probable. If the defence is acceptable as probable the cheque therefore cannot be held to have been issued in discharge of the debt as, for example, if a cheque is issued for security or for any other purpose the same would not come within the purview of Section 138 of the Act.” From these observations, it appears that if the cheque was not issued for discharge of any debt or liability but as a security only, offence is not made out under Section 138. 6. Coming to the facts of the present case from the complaint as well as particulars of the agreement executed on 28.1.2005, it is clear that cheque was issued as a security deposit at the time of entering into contract for due performance of the terms of the contract. Agreement shows that the contractor had deposited the undated cheque no.027840 with the respondent as refundable security deposit for due performance of the agreement. Even the allegations in the complaint are not different. Admittedly, when this agreement was entered into, no debt or liability was in existence and under that agreement, parties had entered into a contract whereby contractor was to perform certain works for the respondent. Naturally, as per the terms of the contract and the allegations made in the complaint if the contractor would fail to perform the agreement, respondent could encash the cheque and recover an amount of security deposit. 7. The learned counsel for the respondents vehemently contended that the contractor was to perform so many works and in respect of some works, his rates were higher and in respect of some other, rates were lower than the other bidders. He was also advanced certain amount for carrying out certain works from time to time. Contractor had completed works in which higher rates were given to him but he ignored to carry out those works where the rates were less and thereafter he ignored to complete those particular works resulting into the disputes between the parties. Admittedly, the disputes had occurred in the year 2006 and the contractor filed a suit against the respondent in the year 2006. Not only was this, admittedly, matter also referred to arbitrator in respect of said disputes. The learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that undated cheque was lying with the respondent since 28.1.2005. However, for the first time a date “4.6.2008” was put on him and then cheque was presented for encashment, which was returned unpaid with endorsement “payment was stopped”. It shows that date was put on the cheque by the respondents long after disputes had arisen between the parties. Proviso (a) to Section 138 requires that the cheque should be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. In the present case though the cheque was drawn and handed over on 28.1.2005, date was not put on it. If the date would have been put, cheque would have been valid for six months from 28.1.2005. However, the respondent put the date 4.6.2008, i.e., almost three years after the period of cheque was over. Thus, the cheque was not presented to the drawee bank within six months from the date when it was actually drawn. Anyhow, it is not necessary to enter into that controversy for the purpose of deciding the present petition. Fact remains that the cheque was issued towards the security deposit and not towards the discharge of any debt or liability. 8 . The learned counsel for the respondent contends that it is not necessary that the cheque should be issued for discharge of a debt.According to him, it may be issued towards the discharge of other liability also and in support of this, he placed reliance on ICDS Limited v. Beena Shabeer and Another (2002) 6 SCC 426. In that case, husband of the accused/respondent no.1 had obtained a car under hire purchase agreement from the complainant. The accused was a guarantor for payment of the amount by her husband and towards the part payment of the said transaction, she had issued a cheque in favour of the complainant. Cheque was dishonoured and the payment was not made in spite of the notice. High Court quashed the complaint on the ground that cheque from the guarantor could not be said to have been issued for the purpose of discharge of any debt or liability. However, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court. The Supreme Court observed thus in paragraphs 10 and 11. “10. The language, however, has been rather specific as regards the intent of the legislature. The commencement of the section stands with the words “Where any cheque”. The above noted three words are of extreme significance, in particular, by reason of the user of the word “any”the first three words suggest that in fact for whatever reason if a cheque is drawn on an account maintained by him with a banker in favour of another person for the discharge of any debt or other liability, the highlighted words if read with the first three words at the commencement of Section 138, leave no manner of doubt that for whatever reason it may be, the liability under this provision cannot be avoided in the event the same stands returned by the banker unpaid. The legislature has been careful enough to record not only discharge in whole or in part of any debt but the same includes other liability as well. This aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the High Court, neither been dealt with or even referred to in the impugned judgment. 11. The issue as regards the coextensive liability of the guarantor and the principal debtor, in our view, is totally out of the purview of Section 138 of the Act, neither the same calls for any discussion therein. The language of the statute depicts the intent of the lawmakers to the effect that wherever there is a default on the part of one in favour of another and in the event a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other liability there cannot be any restriction or embargo in the matter of application of the provisions of Section 138 of the Act. “Any cheque” and “other liability” are the two key expressions which stand as clarifying the legislative intent so as to bring the factual context within the ambit of the provisions of the statute. Any contra interpretation would defeat the intent of the legislature. The High Court, it seems, got carried away by the issue of guarantee and guarantor’s liability and thus has overlooked the true intent and purport of Section 138 of the Act. The judgments recorded in the order of the High Court do not have any relevance in the contextual facts and the same thus do not lend any assistance to the contentions raised by the respondents.” Supreme Court in ICDS Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer and Another (2002) Supreme Court Cases 426 considered provisions of the law and held that when the cheque is issued by the guarantor in discharge of such other liability, provisions of section 138 are applicable. Infact, section 138 itself specifically provides that the cheque should have been issued by a person for the discharge of any debt or other liability. The guarantor may not be himself a debtor but he guarantees the repayment of the loan taken by the principal debtor. By giving such a guarantee, the guarantor incurs a liability towards the creditor and for the discharge of that liability, if he issues cheque, he will be covered by the provisions of Section 138. As the cheque was issued for the discharge of “other liability” case would be covered by Section 138. 9 In the present case, there was no liability or debt towards the complainant/respondent when the cheque was issued by the contractor. From the language of the agreement as well as allegations made in the complaint, it is clear that said cheque was issued as security deposit and not towards the discharge of any debt or lone. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that in M.S.Narayana Menon @ Mani (Supra), evidence was led by the parties and on the basis of evidence, the Supreme Court came to conclusion that the cheque was issued as a security and, therefore, Section 138 would not be applicable. According to the learned counsel, in this case only process has been issued and the parties are yet to go to the trial and, therefore, said authority in M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani (Supra) would not be applicable. It would be difficult to accept this contention. Ratio in M.S.Narayana Menon @ Mani (Supra), is applicable to the facts of the present case. When on the face of the complaint itself, it is clear that the cheque was issued as a security deposit and not towards the discharge of any debt or other liability, case under Section 138 is not made out. When the complaint itself does not make out criminal case to issue the process, to force the accused to undergo trial would be clear misuse of the process of the Court and this should not be allowed. The Additional Sessions Judge while rejecting the revision application dealt with the liability of the contractor on the basis of terms of the contract and the cheque. The learned counsel for the respondent also contended that the matter was referred to arbitrator and arbitrator also held that the contractor is liable to pay on the basis of that cheque. As far as civil liability of the contractor/petitioner is concerned, it is not necessary to look into the same in present matter. Suit was filed in the year 2006 and the arbitrator was also appointed in 2008, therefore, civil liability of the parties against each other can be looked into the said litigation or arbitration proceedings. In the present matter, we have only to see whether the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is made out or not. The learned Revisional Court did not address to this question properly before rejecting revision application. 10 In view of the facts and circumstances, I find that no case to issue process under Section 138 was made out and, therefore, process issued by the trial Court is liable to be quashed. 11 For the aforesaid reasons, petition is allowed. The order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate to issue process under Section 138 is hereby quashed. Rule made absolute accordingly.

Whether 2nd FIR maintainable

While on one hand the manner of recording of First Information Report (FIR) and the commission of offences revealing from FIR are take with caution and circumspection, the Supreme Court in a recent decision (Babubhai v. State of Gujarat) has approved the recording of more than one FIR in respect of same acts committed on the ground that the police is required to register the FIR on the basis of the information provided and that "where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible".

Making a reference to the earlier decisions of the Court on the issue, the Bench declared the position of law in the following terms;

12. In Ram Lal Narang Vs. Om Prakash Narang & Anr. AIR 1979 SC 1791, this Court considered a case wherein two FIRs had been lodged. The first one formed part of a subsequent larger conspiracy which came to the light on receipt of fresh information. Some of the conspirators were common in both the FIRs and the object of conspiracy in both the cases was not the same. This Court while considering the question as to whether investigation and further proceedings on the basis of both the FIRs was permissible held that no straitjacket formula can be laid down in this regard. The only test whether two FIRs can be permitted to exist was whether the two conspiracies were identical or not. After considering the facts of the said case, the Court came to the conclusion that both conspiracies were not identical. Therefore, lodging of two FIRs was held to be permissible. 

13. In T.T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 181, this Court dealt with a case wherein in respect of the same cognizable offence and same occurrence two FIRs had been lodged and the Court held that there can be no second FIR and no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. The investigating agency has to proceed only on the information about commission of a cognizable offence which is first entered in the Police Station diary by the Officer In-charge under Section 158 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called the Cr.P.C.) and all other subsequent information would be covered by Section 162 Cr.P.C. for the reason that it is the duty of the Investigating Officer not merely to investigate the cognizable offence report in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and the Investigating Officer has to file one or more reports under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Even after submission of the report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., if the Investigating Officer comes across any further information pertaining to the same incident, he can make further investigation, but it is desirable that he must take the leave of the court and forward the further evidence, if any, with further report or reports under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. In case the officer receives more than one piece of information in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences such information cannot properly be treated as an FIR as it would, in effect, be a second FIR and the same is not in conformity with the scheme of the Cr.P.C. The Court further observed as under:

“A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate……. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.” 

14. In Upkar Singh Vs. Ved Prakash & Ors. (2004) 13 SCC 292, this Court considered the judgment in T.T. Antony (supra) and explained that the judgment in the said case does not exclude the registration of a complaint in the nature of counter claim from the purview of the court. What had been laid down by this Court in the aforesaid case is that any further complaint by the same complainant against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Cr.P.C. because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further the complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence, will be prohibited under section 162 Cr.P.C. However, this rule will not apply to a counter claim by the accused in the first complaint or on his behalf alleging a different version of the said incident. Thus, in case, there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, the Investigating Agency would take the same on two different FIRs and investigation can be carried under both of them by the same investigating agency and thus, filing an FIR pertaining to a counter claim in respect of the same incident having a different version of events, is permissible.

15. In Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2006) 1 SCC 732, this Court reconsidered the earlier judgment including T.T. Antony (supra) and held that in case the FIRs are not in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences nor are they alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence as the one alleged in the First FIR, there is no prohibition in accepting the second FIR.

16. In Nirmal Singh Kahlon Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. (2009) 1 SCC 441, this Court considered a case where an FIR had already been lodged on 14.6.2002 in respect of the offences committed by individuals. Subsequently, the matter was handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which during investigation collected huge amount of material and also recorded statements of large number of persons and the CBI came to the conclusion that a scam was involved in the selection process of Panchayat Secretaries. The second FIR was lodged by the CBI. This Court after appreciating the evidence, came to the conclusion that matter investigated by the CBI dealt with a larger conspiracy. Therefore, this investigation has been on a much wider canvass and held that second FIR was permissible and required to be investigated. The Court held as under:

“The second FIR, in our opinion, would be maintainable not only because there were different versions but when new discovery is made on factual foundations. Discoveries may be made by the police authorities at a subsequent stage. Discovery about a larger conspiracy can also surface in another proceeding, as for example, in a case of this nature. If the police authorities did not make a fair investigation and left out conspiracy aspect of the matter from the purview of its investigation, in our opinion, as and when the same surfaced, it was open to the State and/or the High Court to direct investigation in respect of an offence which is distinct and separate from the one for which the FIR had already been lodged.”

17. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the subject emerges to the effect that an FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. is a very important document. It is the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by the Officer In-Charge of the Police Station. It sets the machinery of criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of the investigation which ends with the formation of an opinion under Section 169 or 170 Cr.P.C., as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. Thus, it is quite possible that more than one piece of information be given to the Police Officer Incharge of the Police Station in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case, he need not enter each piece of information in the Diary. All other information given orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the facts mentioned in the First Information Report will be statements falling under Section 162 Cr.P.C. In such a case the court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in case, the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case in respect of the same incident the accused in the first FIR comes forward with a different version or counter claim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted.

Order 9 rule 8,9 CPC

8. Procedure where defendant only appears

Where the defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed, unless the defendant admits the claim or part thereof, in which case the Court shall pass a decree against the defendant upon such admission, and, where part only of the claim has been admitted, shall dismiss the suit so far as it relates to the remainder.

9. Decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh suit

(1) Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit. and shall appoint a day for proceeding with suit.

(2) No order shall be made under this rule unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party.